We present the rst undeniable signatures scheme based on RSA. Since their introduction in 1989 a signi cant amount of work has been devoted to the investigation of undeniable signatures. So far, this work has been based on discrete log systems. In contrast, our scheme uses regular RSA signatures to generate undeniable signatures. In this new setting, both the signature and veri cation exponents of RSA are kept secret by the signer, while the public key consists of a composite modulus and a sample RSA signature on a single public message. Our scheme possesses several attractive properties. First of all, provable security, as forging the undeniable signatures is as hard as forging regular RSA signatures. Second, both the con rmation and denial protocols are zero-knowledge. In addition, these protocols are e cient (particularly, the con rmation protocol involves only two rounds of communication and a small number of exponentiations). Furthermore the RSA-based structure of our scheme provides with simple and elegant solutions to add several of the more advanced properties of undeniable signatures found in the literature, including convertibility of the undeniable signatures (into publicly veri able ones), the possibility to delegate the ability to con rm and deny signatures to a third party without giving up the power to sign, and the existence of distributed (threshold) versions of the signing and con rmation operations. Due to the above properties and the fact that our undeniable signatures are identical in form to standard RSA signatures, the scheme we present becomes a very attractive candidate for practical implementations.
Introduction
The central role of digital signatures in the commercial and legal aspects of the evolving electronic commerce world is well recognized. Digital signatures bind signers to the contents of the documents they sign. The ability for any third party to verify the validity of a signature is usually seen as the basis for the \non-repudiation" aspect of digital signatures, and their main source of attractiveness. However, this universal veri ability (or A preliminary version of this paper appeared in the proceedings of CRYPTO self-authenticating) property of digital signatures is not always a desirable property. Such is the case of a signature binding parties to a con dential agreement, or of a signature on documents carrying private or personal information. In these cases limiting the ability of third parties to verify the validity of a signature is an important goal. However, if we limit the veri cation to such an extent that it cannot be veri ed by, say, a judge in case of a dispute then the whole value of such signatures is seriously questioned. Thus, the question is how to generate signatures which limit the veri cation capabilities yet without giving up on the central property of non-repudiation.
An answer to this problem was provided by Chaum and van Antwerpen CA90] who introduced undeniable signatures. Such signatures are characterized by the property that veri cation can only be achieved by interacting with the legitimate signer (through a con rmation protocol). On the other hand, the signer can prove that a forgery is such by engaging in a denial protocol. It is required that the following property be satis ed: if on a speci c message and signature the con rmation protocol outputs that the pair is a valid signature then on the same input the denial protocol would not output that it is a forgery. The combination of these two protocols, con rmation and denial, protects both the recipient of the signature and the signer, and preserves the non-repudiation property found in traditional digital signatures. The recipient is protected since the ability of a signer to con rm a signature means that at no later point will the signer be able to deny the signature. For example, in the case of an eventual dispute, the recipient of the signature can resort to a designated authority (e.g., a judge) in order to demonstrate the signature's validity. In this case the signer will be required to con rm or deny the signature. If the signer does not succeed in denying (in particular, if it refuses to cooperate) then the signer remains legally bound to the signature (such will be the case if the alleged signature was a correct one). On the other hand the signer is protected by the fact that his signatures cannot be veri ed by unauthorized third parties without his own cooperation and the denial protocol protects him from false claims.
The protection of signatures from universal veri ability is not only justi ed by con dentiality and privacy concerns but it also opens a wide range of applications where verifying a signature is a valuable operation by itself. A typical example presented in the undeniable signatures literature is the case of a software company (or for this matter any other form of electronic publisher) that uses signature con rmation as a means to provides a proof of authenticity of their software to authorized (e.g., paying) customers only. This example illustrates the core observation on which the notion of undeniable signatures stands: verication of signatures, and not only their generation, is a valuable resource to be protected.
Components and security of undeniable signatures schemes
There are three main components to undeniable signature schemes. The signature generation algorithm (including the details of private and public information), the con rmation protocol, and the denial protocol. Signature generation is much like a regular signature generation, namely, an operation performed by the signer on the message which results in a string that is provided to the requester of the signature. The con rmation protocol is usually modeled after an interactive proof where the signer acts as the prover and the holder of the signature as the veri er. The input to the protocol is a message and its alleged signature (as well as the public key information associated with the signer). In case that the input pair is formed by a message and its legitimate signature then the prover can convince the veri er that this is the case, while if the signature does not correspond to the message then the probability of the prover to convince the veri er is negligible. Similarly, the denial protocol is an interactive proof designed to prove that a given input pair does not correspond to a message and its signature. However, if the alleged input signature does correspond to the input message then the probability of the prover to convince the veri er of the contrary is negligible. Note, that engaging in the con rmation protocol and having it fail is not an indication that the signature is invalid, this can only be established through the denial protocol. That is the con rmation protocol only establishes validity, and the denial { invalidity. In addition to the above properties required from the con rmation and denial protocol, there are two basic security requirements on undeniable signatures. The rst is unforgeability, namely, without access to the private key of the signer no one should be able to produce legitimate signatures by himself. This is similar to the unforgeability requirement in the case of regular digital signatures, but here the modeling of the attacker is somewhat more complex. In addition to having access to chosen messages signed by the legitimate signer, the attacker may also get to interact with the signer on di erent instances of the above con rmation and denial protocols, possibly on input pairs of his own choice. The second requirement is non-transferability of the signature, namely, no attacker (under the above model) should be able to convince any other party, without the cooperation of the legitimate signer, of the validity or invalidity of a given message and signature. Both of these requirements induce necessary properties on the components of an undeniable signature scheme. In particular, the con rmation and denial protocols should not leak any information that can be used by an attacker to forge or transfer a signature. As a consequence it is desirable that these protocols be zero-knowledge 1 . As for the strings representing signatures, they should provide no information that could help a party to get convinced of the validity (or invalidity) of the signature. Somewhat more formally, it is required that the legitimate signature(s) corresponding to a given message be simulatable, namely, they should be indistinguishable from strings that can be e ciently generated without knowledge of the secret signing key.
Advanced properties of undeniable signatures
Much of the work on undeniable signatures has been motivated by the search for schemes that provide all of the above properties but that, in addition, enjoy some additional attractive properties. These include convertibility (the possibility to transform undeniable signatures into regular, i.e. self-authenticating, signatures by just publishing a short piece of information, BCDP91]), delegation (enabling selected third parties to con rm/deny signatures but not to sign), distribution of power (threshold version of the signature and con rmation protocols, Ped91]), designated con rmer schemes (in which the recipient of the signature is assured that a speci c third party will be able to con rm the signature at a later time, Cha94]), and designated veri er schemes (in which the prover can make sure 1 At the minimum, if not zero-knowledge, these protocols should be proven to provide no \useful" information for the attacker to break the security of the scheme. that only a speci ed veri er bene ts from interacting with the prover on the con rmation of a signature, JSI96]). More details on these extensions are provided in Section 5.
Previous work on undeniable signatures
Since their introduction in 1989, undeniable signatures have received a signi cant attention in the cryptographic research community CA90, Cha90, BCDP91, DY91, FOO91, Ped91, CHP92, Cha94, Jak94, Oka94, M96, DP96, JSI96, JY96]. These works have provided a variety of di erent schemes for undeniable signatures with variable degrees of security, provability, and additional features. Interestingly, all these works are discrete logarithm based. In BCDP91] the problem of constructing schemes based on di erent assumptions, in particular RSA, was suggested as a possible research direction.
Most in uential are the works of Chaum and van Antwerpen CA90] and Chaum Cha90]. The rst work introduces the notion of undeniable signatures and provides protocols which are the basis for many of the subsequent works. The second improves signi cantly on the initial solution by providing zero-knowledge versions of these protocols. The formalization of the basic notions behind undeniable signatures was mainly carried out in the works by Boyar, Chaum, Damgard and Pedersen BCDP91] and by Damgard and Pedersen DP96] . In BCDP91] the notion of convertible schemes was introduced. In such schemes the signer can publish a short string that converts the scheme into a regular signature scheme. However the scheme presented in BCDP91] was recently broken in M96]. The repaired solution presented therein however does not come with a proof of security. DP96] present the rst convertible schemes with proven security (based on cryptographic assumptions).
Our contribution
Our work is the rst to present undeniable schemes based on RSA 2 . Our undeniable signature scheme produces signatures that are identical in form to RSA signatures. The essential di erence from traditional RSA signatures is that in our case both the signature and verication exponents of RSA are kept secret by the signer, while the public key consists of a composite modulus and a sample RSA signature on a single public message.
Not only does our solution expand the list of available number-theoretic assumptions that su ce to build undeniable signatures, but it achieves and improves, as we show below, in a simple and elegant way several of the desirable properties of undeniable signatures. Unforgeability: Our construction allows us to prove in a simple way that security of these signatures against forging is equivalent to the unforgeability of RSA signatures 3 . Provable unforgeability of undeniable signatures was presented for the rst time in the recent paper by DP96] where forgery of the proposed scheme is proven equivalent to forgery of the ElGamal scheme.
Simulatability: Non-transferability of an RSA signature is a non-standard requirement in the context of traditional RSA. We prove this property under the assumption that deciding 2 Chaum in Cha94] uses RSA signatures on top of regular undeniable signatures to provide \designated con rmer signatures"; however the underlying undeniable signatures are still discrete log-based. on the equality of discrete logarithms under di erent bases is intractable. A similar assumption is required in previous works as well 4 although, by itself, it is not always su cient to prove simulatability of the undeniable signatures. For example in DP96] the simulatability property is only conjectured to follow from such assumptions.
Zero-Knowledge: Our con rmation and denial protocols have the interactive proof properties as explained above and are also zero-knowledge. Therefore they do not leak any information that could otherwise be used for forging signatures. The soundness of our protocols (i.e. the guarantee that the prover/signer cannot cheat) relies on the use of composite numbers of a special form (speci cally, with \safe prime" factors), which are secure moduli for RSA. A signer who chooses a modulus of a di erent form may have some way to cheat in our protocols. To force the signer to choose a \proper" modulus we require that he prove the correct choice of primes at the time he registers his public key with a certi cation authority. A discussion of this issue is presented in Section 4. An interesting question is whether our solution, or a di erent one, can work with a di erent kind of RSA moduli.
E ciency: Our protocols are e cient (comparable to the most e cient alternatives found in the undeniable signatures literature). The con rmation protocol takes two rounds of communication (which is minimal for zero-knowledge protocols GK96]) and involves a small number of exponentiations. The denial protocol is somewhat more expensive as it consists of a basic two-round protocol with small, but not negligible, probability of error (e.g., 1/1000) which needs to be repeated sequentially in order to further reduce the error probability. Its performance is still signi cantly better (by a factor of 10) than alternative protocols that only achieve probability 1/2 in each execution. We also note that in typical uses of undeniable signature schemes one expects to apply more frequently con rmation than denial. The latter is mainly needed to settle legal disputes.
Advanced Properties: In addition to the above security and e ciency properties, our solution naturally achieves several of the advanced features of undeniable signatures mentioned above. Once again it is the structure of RSA, in particular the presence of a secret veri cation exponent, that allows to achieve such properties very elegantly. Convertibility is achieved by publishing the veri cation exponent, thus converting the signatures into regular RSA signatures; delegation is achieved by providing the veri cation exponent to the delegated party which can then run the con rmation and denial protocols but cannot sign messages or forge signatures; distribution of the signature operation builds on the existing threshold solutions for RSA signatures; distribution of con rmation can be also achieved by an adaptation of the regular threshold RSA solutions. We can also adapt existing techniques for the construction of designated con rmer and designated veri er undeniable signatures, thus obtaining these variants also for our scheme. More details are provided in Section 5.
Standard RSA compatibility: An important practical advantage of our RSA-based undeniable scheme is that the signatures themselves are identical in form to standard RSA 4 In our case the discrete logarithms are computed modulo a composite number while in previous works they are modulo a prime. In both cases, the problem is related to the problem of computing discrete logarithms which is considered to be hard (in the case of a composite modulus that di culty is implied by the hardness of factoring and also directly by the assumed security of RSA). However, while the feasibility of computing discrete logarithm implies the feasibility of the above decision problem, the reverse direction is not known to hold.
signatures. In particular, this means that they t directly into existing standardized communication protocols that use (regular) RSA signatures. Technically, our work builds on previous ideas and protocols which we adapt to the RSA case. These previous solutions are designed to exploit the algebraic properties of cyclic groups like Z p (and its subgroups). This is probably the main reason that subsequent work concentrated on these structures as well. Here we show that many of these ideas can be used in the context of RSA, thus answering in the a rmative a question suggested in BCDP91]. In doing so we use ideas from the work of Gennaro et al. GJKR96].
Preliminaries
Notation. Throughout the paper we use the following notations:
For a positive integer k we denote k] def = f1; ; kg. Z n denotes the multiplicative group of integers modulo n, and (n) = (p ? 1)(q ? 1) the order of this group. For an element w 2 Z n we denote by ord(w) the order of w in Z n . The subgroup generated by an element w 2 Z n is denoted by <w>.
The following technical lemmas are needed in our proofs in Section 3.
Lemma 1 Let n = pq, where p < q, p = 2p 0 + 1, q = 2q 0 + 1, and p; q; p 0 ; q 0 are all prime numbers. Then, 1. The order of elements in Z n is one of the set f1; 2; p 0 ; q 0 ; 2p 0 ; 2q 0 ; p 0 q 0 ; 2p 0 q 0 g. 2. Given an element w 2 Z n n f?1; 1g, such that ord(w) < p 0 q 0 then gcd(w ? 1; n) is a prime factor of n.
Proof. 1. To nd the order of elements in Z n it is enough to note that the maximal order of such an element is 2p 0 q 0 and that all the other orders must divide this one. 2. From the above property we get that if 1 < ord(w) < p 0 q 0 , then ord(w) 2 f2; p 0 ; q 0 ; 2p 0 ; 2q 0 g. If ord(w) = 2, w 6 = ?1, then nj(w ? 1)(w + 1) and then gcd(w ? 1; n) must be a non-trivial factor of n. In case that ord(w) = p 0 , w p 0 1 mod n ) w p 0 1 mod q. If w 1 mod q then we have a multiple of q which is smaller than n, otherwise p 0 j (q) = 2q 0 , a contradiction.
The claim follows similarly for the other orders. As a consequence of the above lemma we can assume in our protocols that any value found by a party that does not know (and cannot compute) the factorization of n must be of order at least p 0 q 0 in Z n (except for 1,-1).
Lemma 2 Let n be as in Lemma 1. Given an element w such that ord(w) 2 fp 0 q 0 ; 2p 0 q 0 g then for every m 2 Z n it holds that m 4 2<w>.
Proof. We shall give the proof for the case ord(w) = 2p 0 q 0 and show that m 2 2<w>. If m 2<w> then clearly the claim holds. Otherwise, Z n =<w> m <w>. If m 2 2<w> then we are done, otherwise it must hold that m 2 2 m <w>. This in return requires that m 2<w>, contradiction. The case of ord(w) = p 0 q 0 is proved similarly.
3 The New Undeniable Signature Scheme
In this section we present the details of our scheme. We start by de ning the following set: N = fn j n = pq; p < q; p = 2p 0 + 1; q = 2q 0 + 1; and p; q; p 0 ; q 0 are all prime numbersg
The system is set up by the signer in the following manner: chooses a random element n 2 N ; selects elements e; d 2 (n) such that ed 1 mod (n); chooses a pair (w; S w ) with w 2 Z n , w 6 = 1, S w = w d mod n; sets the public key parameters to the tuple (n; w; S w ); sets the private key to (e; d).
We shall denote by PK the set of all tuples (n; w; S w ) generated as above. We refer the reader to Section 4.3 for a discussion on the form of the public key and how to verify its correctness. In particular, it is shown there that the value of w can always be set to a xed number, e.g. w = 2. This simpli es the public key system and adds to the e ciency of computing exponentiations with base w.
Generating a Signature
To generate a signature on a message m the signer carries out a regular RSA signing operation, i.e. he computes S m = m d mod n, outputting the pair (m; S m ). More precisely, the message m is rst processed through a suitable encoding (e.g., via one-way hashing) before applying the exponentiation such that the resultant signature scheme can be assumed to be unforgeable even against chosen message attacks (plain RSA does not have this property). Given a message m we will denote by m the output of such an encoding of m (we do not specify any encoding in particular) 5 . Thus, the resultant signature of m will be S m def = m d mod n. In the case of the pair (w; S w ) we will slightly abuse the notation and write S w to denote w d mod n (i.e., we directly exponentiate w rather than w).
Con rmation Protocol
In Figure 1 we present a protocol for con rming a signature. It is carried out by two players a prover and a veri er. The public input to the protocol are the public key parameters, namely (n; w; S w ) 2 PK, and a pair (m;Ŝ m ). For the case thatŜ m is a valid signature of m, then P will be able to convince V of this fact, while if the signature is invalid then no prover (even a computationally unbounded one) will be able to convince V to the contrary except for a negligible probability.
This protocol is basically the same as the protocol of Gennaro e tal. GJKR96] (based on Cha90]) where it is used in a di erent application, namely, threshold RSA. Our variation on this protocol uses the veri cation key e rather than the signature key d as originally used in GJKR96] (in their case, the signer knows only d but not e). Still the basic proof given in that paper applies to our case due to the symmetry that exists between d and e when both exponents are kept secret. This modi cation allows us to provide solutions where the ability 5 For simplicity we will assume a deterministic encoding; however randomized encodings, e.g. BR96], can be used as well but then, in our case, the random bits used for the encoding need to be attached to the signature.
to con rm signatures can be delegated to third parties while keeping the ability to sign new messages only for the original signer (it also allows for a distributed prover solution). See Section 5 for the details.
The idea of the protocol is for the veri er to test the alleged signature on m by producing a related element which looks random to the signer and for which the veri er knows the signature (given that the signature on m is correct). This \blinded" element is created via the exponentiation of the message m with a random exponent i as well as through its multiplication with a random exponent j of the value w (for which the correct signature S w is publicly known). Intuitively, a cheating prover needs to nd the values of i and j in order to cheat. However, there are many pairs of exponents that give the same result and we show that the prover (even if computationally unbounded) cannot distinguish among them.
An interesting aspect of this protocol is that a prover could succeed in convincing the For ease of exposition the protocol in Figure 1 appears in a non zero-knowledge format. However, there are well-known techniques GMW91, BCC88, Gol95] to add the zero-knowledge property to the above protocol using the notion of a commitment function: Instead of P sending A in Step 2, he sends a commitment commit(A), after which V reveals to P the values of i and j. After checking that Q def =Ŝ 2i m S w j mod n, P sends A to V . The veri er checks that A corresponds to the value committed by P and then performs the test of Step 3 above. The zero-knowledge condition is achieved through the properties of the commitment function, namely, (i) commit(x) reveals no information on x, and (ii) P cannot nd x 0 such that commit(x) = commit(x 0 ). Commitment functions can be implemented in many ways. For example, in the above protocol commit(A) can be implemented as a probabilistic (semantically secure) RSA encryption of A using a public key for which the private key is not known to V (and possibly, not even known to P ). To open the commitment, P reveals both A and the string r used for the probabilistic encryption. This implementation of a commitment function is very e cient as it does not involve long exponentiations (and is secure since we assume our adversary, the veri er in this case, is unable to break RSA).
Theorem 1 Con rmation Theorem. Let (n; w; S w ) 2 PK.
Completeness. Given S m 2 SIG(m), if P and V follow the Signature Con rmation protocol then V always accepts S m as a valid signature. Soundness. A cheating prover P , even computationally unbounded, cannot convince V to acceptŜ m 6 2 SIG(m) with probability greater than O(1) p 0 .
Zero-knowledge. The protocol is zero-knowledge, namely, on input a message and its valid signature, any (possibly cheating) veri er V interacting with prover P does not learn any information aside from the validity of the signature.
Proof.
Completeness. Immediate from inspection of the protocol. Note that raisingŜ m to an even power eliminates any extra factor of order 2, if such exists, from the signature (such factors are allowed by de nition of SIG(m)). Soundness. We adapt the proof from GJKR96] to our case. The prover's probability to cheat, i.e. to convince V to acceptŜ m 6 2 SIG(m), is maximized by choosing A that passes V 's test (in step 3) with maximal probability (relative to the values i; j chosen by V ). Since the prover chooses A after having seen the \challenge" Q from V (and based on its knowledge ofŜ m ; m; w; d; e and n), then the proof of soundness needs to capture that some information on i; j (at least from the information theoretic point of view) is available to the prover when selecting A.
In the actual protocol, V chooses i; j randomly from the set n]; for simplicity of analysis we will assume that these values are chosen from (n)], and will account for the event that either i or j fall outside of this range in the prover's probability to cheat. The probability of such event (i.e., that i or j = sequel, we assume i; j 2 R (n)]. We de ne I(Q) = fi 2 (n)] : 9j; Q =Ŝ 2i m S j w mod ng. SinceŜ m 6 2 SIG(m) we can writê S m = m d , for 2 Z n , ord( ) > 2. In Step 3 the veri er will check whether A = m 2i w j = ?2eiŜ2ei m S ej w = ?2ei Q e
As the value has been set in advance, then for any A the number of i's which satisfy Equation (1) is the same as the number of i's such that 2i = A ?d Q which is at most (n)=ord( ). Given Q, V 's choice of i is uniformly distributed over I(Q), as for each i 2 I(Q) there is the same number of values j which satisfy the equation Q =Ŝ 2i m S j w mod n. Thus, the probability of P to succeed is at most (n)=ord( ) jI(Q)j . We denote the later quantity by 2 and proceed to bound it by bounding jI(Q)j.
Clearly if V follows the protocol then I(Q) is not empty. Now we show that 8Q properly formed, jI(Q)j ord(w).
For values i 2 I(Q) and such thatŜ 2 m 2<S w >, it holds that i + 2 I(Q) (because there exist j; j 0 such that Q =Ŝ 2i m S j w andŜ 2 m = S j 0 w >from which it follows that Q = S 2(i+ ) m S j?j 0 w ). Therefore, we get that I(Q) = fi 0 + :Ŝ 2 m 2<S w > and < (n)g where i 0 is the minimal element in I(Q). Thus, if I(Q) is non-empty then its size equals the size of the set D = f < (n) :Ŝ 2 m 2<S w >g. We proceed to bound the size of D. Using standard arguments it is easy to show that if is the minimal non-zero element of D then the elements of D are exactly the multiples of (smaller than (n)). Thus, jDj = (n)= . We now show ord(w) . In conclusion, jI(Q)j = jDj = (n)= ord(w). Combining all the above we get that 2 < (n) ord( )ord(w) , and the total failure probability is at most 1 + 2 .
(We stress that the above holds also for a computationally unbounded cheating prover, and that the bound is tight for such a prover, up to the term 1 = 2 n? (n) n .) The above bound on the probability of success of a cheating prover is given in terms of the order of elements in the group Z n . Recall that we are using n's of a special form, i.e. n = pq where p = 2p 0 + 1 and q = 2q 0 + 1, with p; q; p 0 ; q 0 all large primes. Assume w.l.o.g. that p 0 < q 0 . Using Lemma 1 we can claim that ord(w) p 0 q 0 and ord( ) p 0 , thus 2 < 4 p 0 . Also, the expression 2 n? (n) n is at most 2=p 0 in this case. This proves the soundness statement in the theorem. Zero-Knowledge. Immediate (see remarks after the description of the protocol). Figure 2 exhibits the Denial Protocol. The public input to the protocol are the public key parameters, namely (n; w; S w ) 2 PK, and a pair (m;Ŝ m ). In the case thatŜ m 6 2 SIG(m), then P will be able to convince V of this fact, while ifŜ m 2 SIG(m) then no prover (even a computationally unbounded one) will be able to convince V that the signature is invalid except with negligible probability.
Denial Protocol
Our solution is based on a protocol due to Chaum Cha90], designed to prove in zeroknowledge the inequality of the discrete logarithms of two elements over a prime eld Z p relative to two di erent bases. The protocol and proof presented in the above paper do not work over Z n for a composite n as required here, in particular, since they strongly rely on the existence of a generator for the multiplicative group Z p . However, a careful adaptation of that protocol and a more involved proof can be shown to solve our problem over Z n .
The protocol (see In order to allow for an exhaustive search of i by P , one needs to choose the range of i to be relatively small. If the upper bound on i is set to some value k, then the prover needs to perform k multiplications (of the value m S e m ) to nd i. The protocol has thus probability of error 1 k . Notice that by choosing k = O(log n) the cost of the exhaustive search is then roughly equivalent to a single long exponentiation. On the other hand, the probability of cheating in this case is 1=k. If we take, for example, k = 1024 we can repeat the protocol ten times in order to achieve a security of 1 2 100 . As stated in the introduction this allows for a ten fold increase in e cency relative to alternative protocols that need to repeat a subprotocol that bounds the cheating probability by only 1/2.
The protocol as presented in Figure 2 omits the steps that make it zero-knowledge. This is similar to the case of the con rmation protocol. Yet, in this protocol special care needs to be taken in Step 2. If the (honest) prover does not nd a value i that satis es the equation, which means that V is cheating, P aborts the execution of the protocol.
Though aborting the protocol does not reveal much information it does reveal some, and in the zero-knowledge version we do not want even this much information to leak. Thus, P should continue the execution of the protocol by committing to the value 0, in a \dummy commitment" this will conceal the information of whether a value i was found or not. Note that in the case where no i was found, the veri er will be exposed later as a cheater and the commitment of 0 will never be revealed.
Theorem 2 Denial Protocol Let (n; w; S w ) 2 PK.
Completeness. Assuming thatŜ m 6 2 SIG(m), and if P and V follow the protocol then V always accepts thatŜ m is not a valid signature of m. Soundness. Assuming thatŜ m 2 SIG(m) then a cheating prover P , even computationally unbounded, cannot convince V to reject the signature with probability greater than
Zero-knowledge. The protocol is zero-knowledge, namely, on input a message and a nonvalid signature, any (possibly cheating) veri er V interacting with prover P does not learn any information aside from the fact thatŜ m is in fact not a valid signature for the message m.
Completeness. In the following we omit the modn from the notation. We can assume that As (e; (n)) = 1 we have that ord( e ) p 0 . As we take k p 0 we prove our claim. Soundness. We stress that the following proof holds also for a computationally unbounded prover. In order for P to convince V thatŜ m is not a valid signature he must send V a value A such that A = i. Even for a computationally unboundend prover, the best strategy is to compute l s.t. w l = m 4 and, given w lb+j , to compute the value r such that w r = w lb+j . Then to compute i the prover still needs to nd b, that is he needs to solve the equation r = lb + j mod ord(w). Assuming that j 2 R (n)] then for every possible value of b there would be (n) ord(w) possible value of j indicating that the best P could do is to guess at random giving a probability of 1 k . Allowing for the fact that j 2 R n] (instead of j 2 R (n)] as assumed above) we get 1 k + O(1) p 0 . Zero-knowledge. The protocol as presented in Figure 2 is not zero-knowledge. However, as explained above, using the same techniques described in the con rmation protocol (and a \dummy commitment" in case of early abortion) we achieve zero-knowledge for this protocol as well.
Security Analysis
We do not present here a formal treatment of the security requirements of undeniable signatures. For such a formal and complete treatment we refer the reader to the paper by Damgard and Pedersen DP96] ; an outline of these notions can be found above in our introduction (in particular, in Section 1.1). Here we argue the security properties of our solution based on this outline, and the zero-knowledge results from previous section.
Unforgeability of signatures
We consider an attacker that cannot forge regular RSA signatures. When attacking our undeniable signatures scheme this attacker may request signatures (and their con rmation) on any messages of its choice. The attacker can also choose pairs of messages and alleged signatures and engage in con rmation or denial protocols with the signer on these inputs (whether it engages in a con rmation or denial protocol depends on the validity or invalidity, respectively, of the input pair). The goal of the attacker is to forge a signature, namely, to generate a valid signature on a message not previously signed by the legitimate signer.
We rst note that since both con rmation and denial protocols are zero-knowledge then the information provided to the attacker by these protocols is useless for attacking the signatures (in the sense that the same information can be generated by the attacker alone). Therefore, an attacker could essentially try to forge signatures based on the public keys and a (possibly chosen) set of messages and their valid signatures. However, since our signatures are equivalent to regular RSA signatures (except for the fact that the veri cation exponent is secret which can only make it harder for the attacker) then the ability to forge our undeniable signatures would translate into forging regular RSA signatures which we assume infeasible. (As noted before, RSA is not directly immune against chosen message attacks but we assume this to be countered by additional means, e.g. by the appropriate encoding of the message prior to the exponentiation { see Section 3.1.)
Formalizing the above arguments is quite straightforward and standard. Such a formal proof would show how to transform any given forging attacker against our undeniable signatures into a forging attacker against regular RSA signatures; the transformation would make use of the simulators for our zero-knowledge protocols (both con rmation and denial). We summarize this discussion in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 Assuming that the underlying RSA signatures are unforgeable (against known and/or chosen message attacks) then our undeniable signatures are unforgeable (against the same attacks).
Indistinguishability of signatures
A basic goal of undeniable signatures is that no one should be able to verify the validity (or invalidity) of a message and its (alleged) signature without interacting with the legitimate signer in a con rmation (or denial) protocol. Following DP96] we need to show that given the public key information and any message m (but not the signature exponent d) one can e ciently generate a simulated signature s(m) of m, in the sense that the distribution of simulated signatures cannot be distinguished (e ciently) from the distribution of true signatures on m. We achieve this property in the following way. Given any message m, we apply to it the encoding m as determined by the underlying RSA scheme and then raise the result m to a random exponent modulo n (i.e., s(m) = m r mod n, for r 2 R n]). Notice that distinguishing s(m) from the signature m d mod n on m is equivalent to deciding whether log m (s(m)) ? = log w (S w )
where the discrete logarithm operation is taken in Z n . This problem has no known e cient solution, though its equivalence to RSA, factoring, or the discrete logarithm problems has not been established. 6 We thus require the following intractability assumption in order to claim the hardness of distinguishing between valid and simulated signatures.
Assumption EDL: For values n; w; S w ; m, and s(w) as de ned above it is infeasible to decide the validity of equation (2) over Z n .
We stress that the analogous assumption modulo a prime number is necessary for claiming the security of previous undeniable signature schemes as well (see DP96]). However, while we can prove that the EDL assumption implies the simulatability of our signatures, in DP96] this implication is not proven but just conjectured to hold.
Theorem 4 Under the above EDL assumption, our signatures are simulatable and hence cannot be veri ed without the signer's (or its delegated con rmers) cooperation.
Remark: The above theorem does not concern itself with a general problem of undeniable signatures pointed out rst by Desmedt and Yung DY91] . It is possible that the signer is fooled into proving a signature to several (mutually distrustful) veri ers while he is convinced of proving the signature to only one of them. We will address this problem in Section 5.
Choosing the signer's keys
In Section 3 we de ned what the public and private parameters for the signer should be. Our analysis of the (soundness of the) con rmation and denial protocols depends on these parameters being selected correctly. Typically, the veri cation of this public key will be done whenever the signer registers it with a trusted party (e.g., a certi cation authority). Here we outline protocols to check the right composition of the modulus n, the sample element w, and the fact that S w is chosen as a power of w (the latter serves as the \commitment" of the signer to the signature exponent d). Notice that these protocols are executed only once at registration time and not during the subsequent signing/veri cation operations. We denote by V the entity that acts as the veri er of these parameters, and by P the signer that proves its correct choices.
Verification that w is of high order. Speci cally, we use in our analysis the assumption that w is an element of order at least p 0 q 0 . By virtue of Lemma 1 all that V needs to verify is that w = 2 f?1; 1g and that gcd(w ? 1; n) is not a factor of n. Actually, the value w can be chosen as a constant, e.g. w = 2, for all the undeniable signatures public keys. Such a value must always pass the veri cation (or otherwise factoring is trivial). The problem is at least as hard as the decisional Di e-Hellman problem (i.e., given a triple (g x ; g y ; r) decide whether r = g xy ). For the case of a composite modulus (our case), the related search problem (given g x ; g y nd g xy ) is known to be at least as hard as factoring Shm85, McC88] . A similar result for the decisional problem is not known; such a result would imply that all the security aspects of our construction could be based solely on the security of RSA. value r, otherwise it returns the value d + r mod (n). In the rst case, V checks whether w r = w 0 , and in the second, whether w (r+d) = w 0 S w . If w = 2<w> then the probability that P passes this test is 1=2. By repeating this procedure k times the probability that the dealer can cheat reduces to 2 ?k . The protocol is statistical zero-knowledge as the simulator does not know (n), but can use the uniform distribution on 1::n] to statistically approximate the one on 1:: (n)]. As a practical matter, we observe that this protocol can be performed non-interactively if one assumes the existence of an ideal hash function (a la ). Verification of the prime factors. We need to check that the signer chooses the modulus n of the right form, i.e. n = pq with p = 2p 0 + 1 and q = 2q 0 + 1 and p; q; p 0 ; q 0 are all prime numbers. We have three alternative solutions for this problem. The rst is to use a generic zero-knowledge proof of the above property using the general results of GMW91]; although the resultant solution would be highly ine cient this task is performed only once at system initialization. A more e cient (but less secure) solution to this problem is to let the signer generate a large set of moduli n 1 ; n 2 ; ; n k from which V chooses a random element, say n i . Next, P shows the factorization into primes of all the other moduli in the set. If all are of the right form then n i is chosen as the modulus n, otherwise P is disquali ed. The drawback of this solution is that the probability of cheating, i.e. 1=k, reduces only linearly with the amount of work in the protocol. Yet once again, the protocol needs to be performed only at initialization of the modulus and thus a relatively large number k of moduli can be produced. (Although this gives only \linear security" we stress that under the appropriate legal circumstances a probability of, say 999/1000, to be caught cheating can be a signi cant deterrent for anyone to register an invalid key.)
Finally, there is a solution Dam] that allows for a trade-o between the error probability at the key registration stage and the performance cost of the undeniable signature scheme.
Initially, we let P generate 2k moduli. V chooses at random k of them of which the signer must reveal the factorizations. If the factorization of those moduli was of the correct form, we run our basic scheme in parallel for all the remaining k moduli. A con rmation or denial is accepted only if it works for all k moduli. The signer can only cheat if all the opened moduli were good, and all the remaining bad, but for any given set of moduli, this will only happen with exponentially small probability in k. In practice, one can choose parameters more appropriately. For example it doesn't have to be 2k and k moduli since with a total of 100 moduli, V choosing 95 of them and keeping only 5 to do the scheme in parallel, the error probability is close to 10 ?9 .
Extensions
Our protocols lend themselves to many of the existing extensions in the literature for undeniable signatures.
Convertible Undeniable Signatures
This variation appeared rst in BCDP91], and secure schemes based on ElGamal signatures have been recently presented in DP96]. Convertible undeniable signatures enable the signer to publish a value which transforms the undeniable signature into a regular (i.e., self-authenticating) digital signature. In our scheme conversion can be easily achieved by simply publishing the value e = d ?1 mod (n). Doing so the signer will transform the undeniable signatures into regular RSA signatures with public key (n; e). Notice that this will automatically imply the security (i.e., unforgeability) of the converted scheme, based on the security of regular RSA signatures. 7 Selective Conversion. In some applications it may be desirable to convert only a subset of the past signatures (selective conversion BCDP91]). For this scenario we can make use of a non-interactive zero-knowledge con rmation proof for those messages.
Let (m 1 ; S 1 ); : : :; (m`; S`) be the message{signature pairs that the signer wants to convert. If the signer were allowed to interact with an honest veri er he could use the publiccoin, statistical zero-knowledge, con rmation protocol in Figure 3 In order to use this protocol for selective conversion we need to make it non{interactive using standard techniques (e.g. computing the challenge via a hash-function applied to the rst message.) Security is retained in the random oracle model.
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Notice that this holds if the signer issued for the message m its intended signature Sm = m d mod n. If, instead, the signer generated a signature of the form Sm = m d , where is an element of order 2, then when e is made public it is easy to recover (and then the factorization of n) from a triple (m; Sm = m d ; e) since e is odd. We stress that although we consider as valid also signatures of that form (see Section 3.2), it is in the interest of the prover not to generate them in that way.
Delegation
The idea is for the signer to delegate the ability to con rm and deny to a third party without providing that party the capabilities to generate signatures. In the literature this notion is usually treated in the context of convertibility of signatures. However the two notions are conceptually di erent. Clearly the information used in order to delegate con rmation/denial authority to a third party if made public would basically convert undeniable signatures into universally veri able ones. However the converse is not necessarily true. It may be that the information used to convert signatures, if given secretly to a third party, would still not allow that party to prove in a non{transferable way the validity/invalidity of a signature 9 .
In our setting the signer can simply give the third party the key e which is the only needed information in order to carry out successfully the denial and con rmation protocols. Clearly, the recipient of e cannot sign by itself as this is the basic assumption behind regular RSA signatures.
Distributed Provers (and signers)
Distributed Provers for undeniable signatures were introduced by Pedersen Ped91] . With distributed provers the signer can delegate the capability to con rm/deny signatures, without needing to trust a single party. This is obtained by sharing the key, used to verify signatures, using a (veri able) secret sharing scheme among the provers. This way only if t out of the n provers cooperate it is possible to verify or deny a signature. The existing solutions for threshold RSA signatures DDFY94, GJKR96] can then be used to obtain an e cient distributed scheme as the only operation needed during con rmation or denial protocols is RSA exponentiations. The fault-tolerance of the protocol in GJKR96] guarantees the security of the scheme even in the presence of t (out of n) maliciously behaving provers.
As Pedersen pointed out in Ped91], undeniable signatures with distributed provers present some di culties. Indeed when the provers are presented with a message and its alleged signature, they have to decide which protocol (either the denial or the con rmation) to use. They can do this by rst distributively checking for themselves if the claimed signature is correct or not. But this in turn means that a dishonest prover can use the other provers as an oracle to the veri cation key at his will. The problem applies to our schemes as well. Several ways of dealing with the problem have been suggested in the literature Ped91, JY96] some of which easily extend to our scenario.
Also solutions for threshold RSA allow to share the power to sign (in addition to the power to verify/deny signatures) among several servers. Once again in case of possibly maliciously behaving signers a fault-tolerant scheme as GJKR96] must be used.
Designated Veri er
The following problem of undeniable signatures has been pointed out (see DY91, Jak94]): in general a mutually suspicious group of veri ers can get simultaneously convinced of the validity of a signature by interacting with the signer in a single execution of the con rmation protocol (in other words, the signer may believe that it is providing the signature con rmation to a single veri er while in actuality several of them are getting convinced at once). This is possible by having the \o cial" veri er act as the intermediary (or man in the middle) between the prover and the larger set of veri ers. While this is not always a problem, in some cases this may defeat the purpose of undeniable signatures (e.g., if the signer wants to receive payment from each veri er that gets a signature con rmation).
Jakobsson et al. JSI96] present a solution to this problem through the notion of designated veri ers proofs that is readily applicable to our scheme. All that is required is for the veri er to have a public key. Then when the prover commits to his answer during the zero-knowledge steps of our protocols he will use a trapdoor commitment scheme (as in BCC88]) which the veri er can open in any way. This will prevent the veri er from \transferring" the proof (see JSI96] for the details).
Designated Con rmer
Designated con rmer undeniable signatures were introduced by Chaum in Cha94] and further studied by Okamoto in Oka94] . This variant of undeniable signature is used to provide the recipient of a signature with a guarantee that a speci ed third party (called a \designated con rmer") will later be able to con rm that signature. Notice the di erence between this variant and the delegation property described above. Indeed in the present case the signature is speci cally bound at time of generation to a particular con rmer. The techniques of Cha94, Oka94] easily extend to our scheme.
